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Introduction and summary
Policymakers are naturally interested in the effects of
interest rates on various economic activities. This article
studies how interest rates affect entrepreneurs’ propensi-
ties to initiate new projects. Since the implementation
of new ideas and production techniques is an important
engine driving long-run economic growth, the effect of
real rates on this activity should be of particular interest.
This article illustrates that the effect of interest rates on
the incentives to implement is not monotonic. Starting
at high interest rates, a fall in the interest rate will spur
entrepreneurs to implement projects more rapidly. But
lowering interest rates even further will only persuade
entrepreneurs to delay.
Ordinarily it would be difficult to measure the
extent of delay, since we cannot easily identify when
an economic agent first received the opportunity to
bring a project to fruition. To get around this, we look
at initial public offerings (IPOs). Although the deci-
sion to issue an IPO may reflect a host of consider-
ations, Jain and Kini (1994) find that IPOs appear to
be related to growth in investment and sales. More
importantly, we can measure the amount of time that
transpired between when a firm was founded or in-
corporated and when its IPO was issued, so we have
a reasonable proxy for the delay time. Data on the time
it takes firms to go public show a non-monotonic cor-
relation between interest rates and the age at which
the firm goes public. High rates of interest induce a
delay and discourage investment for the usual reason,
namely that when future income is discounted more
heavily, it is not worthwhile to sacrifice current re-
sources. Very low rates of interest, however, also dis-
courage investment, because profits that are foregone
during the delay are not as costly in comparison with
the gains to delaying.
Chetty (2001) has shown that irreversibility of in-
vestment can lead to a non-monotonic relation between
interest rates and investment. In his two-period model,
if investment is postponed to the second period, the
firm can better react to news about demand conditions.
Aside from offering a different model, we also provide
evidence on the non-monotonicity. In earlier work,
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) show that the incen-
tive to delay implementing a project gets stronger as
the interest rate falls. In that paper, we also provide an
information-theoretic rationale for the gains to waiting,
but do not give any evidence.
The non-monotonicity of physical investment in
the interest rate stems, ultimately, from the fact that
the firm is giving up profits while it waits to implement
its project. The decision to wait itself delivers infor-
mation, that is, human capital, hence what is really
happening is a substitution of one form of capital for
another. We comment on this again in the conclusion
and the implications that it may have for countries
like Japan that are experiencing low investment, in
spite of enjoying very low interest rates.
In the next section, we explain the model, and in
the following section we describe its main implications
for the data that we have. Then, we test those impli-
cations and discuss some related literature.
The model
The following model is a simplified version of
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001). Suppose the firm lives
forever and has the property rights to its project. When
implemented, the project produces output using3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
knowledge and physical capital k. The firm starts to
receive net revenue cash only after it implements the
project. Let T denote the waiting time until implemen-
tation. Suppose that while it waits, the firm’s potential
output is
y = f(T).
We assume that f increases with T but at a diminish-
ing rate, as drawn in figure 1. In this formulation the
firm starts receiving y only after implementing the
project. At that point the project starts yielding profits.
Moreover there are no direct costs. In that case the im-
plementation decision is much like the decision of how
long to remain in school. This is like perfecting an
idea before taking out a patent on it.
Choosing the implementation date when
there is no physical capital
If the firm lives forever and has the property rights
to its project, it must just decide when to implement
it. There are no direct costs. Only implicit “foregone-
earnings” costs. The problem we analyze is similar to
the well-known tree-cutting problem in economics, in
which one wants to figure out the optimal time to cut
down a tree. The trade-off involved is that between
selling a young tree for cash today as opposed to selling
a more mature tree for more cash tomorrow. The rate
of interest has an important influence on that trade-off.
Formally, the firm’s problem is that of choosing
the implementation date T to maximize the present






One can show that the optimal timing will satisfy
the following equation:
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The left-hand side of equation 1 is the foregone-earn-
ings costs of waiting another period. In the problem
as stated, this is the only cost. The right-hand side is
the gain from waiting. Since this gain is received in
every subsequent (production) period, it is capital-
ized, and hence the r in the denominator. It is more
revealing to write the condition as









is the rate of growth of potential output. Thus, the im-
plementation occurs when g equals the rate of interest.
Example
As an example, consider f(t)=Atα, where α < 1.
Here the condition reads  r
T
α





In this simple version of the model, then, a rise in
the rate of interest hastens the implementation because
it makes the foregone-earnings cost of waiting more im-
portant relative to the future gains from waiting. Inter-
estingly, the productivity of the firm, A, does not affect
the firm’s implementation date because it simply scales
both costs and revenues in the same proportion.
The parameter α will be important in what follows.
It measures the gain in productivity that the firm gets
by delaying its implementation. Delay lets the firm
resolve technological uncertainties, perfect its ideas,
and choose the right inputs for its production process.
Adding physical capital
To the extent that implementation entails spend-
ing on capital goods (as suggested by the evidence in
Jain and Kini, 1994), this implies that the effect of the
real rate of interest on investment is unambiguously
FIGURE 1
Post-IPO output of the firm as a function
of its age at IPO
y = output
t = age
f(t)4 4Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
positive! Lower rates discourage implementation by
inducing firms to wait longer so as to perfect their in-
vestments. The only cost is that of the profits that are
postponed—a foregone-earnings cost.
In reality, firms must incur direct costs of imple-
mentation. However, these direct costs now introduce
a new consideration: Higher interest rates imply it is
better to defer these costs into the future since their
present value is smaller. This suggests that lowering
the interest rate will mitigate the incentive to delay,
and that ignoring fixed costs of implementation (even
if they do not correspond to measured investment) may
be misleading. Therefore, we now introduce capital
expenditure of I that is incurred at the implementa-
tion date. This modifies the firm’s problem to one of
choosing T to maximize the following present value:
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One can now show that the optimal timing will
satisfy the following equation:
1
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Now g is essentially a quadratic in r.
When r is small, the effect of r on g is
positive as before, but when r gets large,
the opposite is true, and the effect of r on
g is non-monotonic. Note, too, that the
coefficient on r² is the capital output ratio.
As a result, the effect on T is non-mono-
tonic too, and with it the effect on imple-
mentation investment.
The example again
To illustrate this, let us return to and
augment the example f(t) = Atα we out-
lined above. The firm’s problem becomes
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Figure 2 plots the optimal implementation delay on
the vertical axis and the rate of interest on the horizontal
axis. We see that for a smaller r, the term 2/r dominates,
driving T to infinity. For a larger r, the term rI/A domi-
nates, again driving T to infinity. We therefore have a
U-shaped relation between r on the horizontal axis
and T on the vertical, as illustrated in figure 2 for the
case where I = 30A. We also plot T for the case where
I = 45A, and I = 60A. We note that 1) the curves bot-
tom out at levels of r ranging between 5 percent and
10 percent, and 2) higher investment outlays imply
longer waiting at all levels of the interest rate. For
practical purposes, however, the size of the outlay, I,
starts to matter only when the interest rate is relative-
ly high, say above 4 percent.
Implications of the model
The model has time-series and cross-sectional
implications. The time-series implications concern
low-frequency movements in T and the market value
of the firm at IPO, which we denote as
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 We are especially interested
in the relation between interest rates and IPO invest-
ment. The model assumes that r is fixed, and there-
fore we may, at best, take figure 2 to predict the
effects on T of low-frequency movements in r. These
movements will induce changes in total investment
spending—the total outlays on I—that we associate
with implementation investment. The above frame-
work lets us derive the following results.
FIGURE 2
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Relationship between time to go public and
the real interest rate
At low frequencies, the relation between T and r
is U-shaped, as figure 2 shows. This means that the
investment schedule is backward bending. We note
that the negative relationship that emerges at low lev-
els of the real rate is more pronounced than the posi-
tive relation at higher rates and that such high rates
are not often observed.
Relationship between investment and the real
interest rate
The results on the effects of r on T
can now be translated into results for IPO
investment. A rise in T means that invest-
ment is postponed. Consider the stock of
new projects that need implementing. Into
this stock there is an inflow of new projects
as entrepreneurs get new ideas and at the
same time an outflow due to projects be-
ing implemented. Investment will be pro-
portional to the outflow of projects,
because any project that is implemented
requires investment. An increase in T will
imply that the current cohort of projects
will take a long time to leave. But if the
inflow of ideas is constant, in the new
steady state the outflow will be constant
as well. Any effects of changes in T will
only affect the transitional path.
The size of this transient effect will
depend on the difference TNEW – TOLD.
To see this more clearly, consider an econ-
omy that has a constant inflow of ideas. If
a change in r (perceived by firms to be per-
manent) raises T, then strictly speaking we
should see no investment at all for TNEW –
TOLD periods, followed immediately by the
same steady state investment rate as took
place before the change. Conversely, if a
change in r lowers T, then there would im-
mediately be a burst of investment that im-
plements all existing ideas that are older
than TNEW. The general point is that interest-
rate variation at low frequencies will pro-
duce changes in investment that are in the
direction opposite to the change in T, and
this change is related to the level of TNEW.
Roughly speaking, then, decade to
decade, we may expect a negative relation
between T and implementation invest-
ment. Therefore, the relation between in-
vestment on the vertical axis and the rate
of interest on the horizontal should have an inverted-
U shape. We illustrate this in figure 3. The vertical
axis shows the ratio I/T plotted against r by decade.
The curves cross because T is increasing in I, and the
ratios are not ordered the same way at different lev-
els of r. But what is important here is the inverted-U
shape in the graph and this is what we are looking for
in the data.
IPO-issuing firms versus stock-market incumbents
Our model derives implementation lags from the
improvement of projects prior to their implementation.
FIGURE 3
Backward bending investment schedules when α α α α α = ½
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It is the upward slope in figure 1 that creates the in-
centive for a firm to delay implementation while the
project is improved and refined. The returns to waiting
should, in turn, depend on how uncertain the environ-
ment is for the firm and its project. These uncertain-
ties are likely to be greater for new products and new
markets, and it is in such products and markets that
new firms predominate. IPO-issuing firms tend to be
new, or they at least tend to be younger than most es-
tablished corporations. Therefore, we expect to see a
difference between the investment behavior of en-
trants and incumbents.
The parameter that the model isolates
in this regard is α. The curvature of f is
likely to be larger, and the returns to wait-
ing likely to be smaller, for established
firms. This is most evident in equation 3,
where a low α reduces the incentive to de-
lay and therefore mitigates the forces that
we have been describing here. In the ex-
panded version of the model where we al-
low for physical investment, this simply
means that the incentive to delay because
of improving the project is weaker relative
to the standard considerations of compar-
ing I with discounted profits.
As a result, we expect to find a quan-
titative difference between the estimated
investment schedules of incumbents and
IPO-issuing firms. Even for incumbents,
the incentives to delay should be there,
but they should be much smaller. We
thus expect to see less of a backward
bend, if any, in the investment schedules
of established firms.
Tests of the implications
Having listed the main implications
of the model, we report on how they fare
with the data, taking them up in the same
order as above. IPOs provide a context for
measuring a delay until investment—Jain
and Kini (1994) find that IPOs are associ-
ated with a rise in investment and sales.
Our use of IPO data in testing the theory
is reasonable if:
1. Funds are a constraint for private com-
panies;
2. IPOs can deliver the funds for a signifi-
cant expansion; and
3. Upon the initial expansion, the firm is
irrevocably defined and its IPO invest-
ments cannot be reversed.
When these assumptions hold at least approxi-
mately, we may interpret the firm’s age at the IPO
date as a proxy for the delay time to investment.
Some of the costs incurred at IPO are transaction
costs—Lee et al. (1996). We lump all costs into I and
treat them as “investment.”1
Testing the relationship between time to go public
and the real interest rate
The first implication says that the relation between
T and r should be U-shaped. To measure T, we
construct average waiting times from founding and
incorporation to stock-exchange listing since 1886,
TABLE 1
Number of
new CRSP Number of Number of
Decade listings incorporations foundings
1890–99 112 52 41
1900–09 112 78 44
1910–19 214 190 97
1920–29 545 492 273
1930–39 231 197 78
1940–49 271 246 97
1950–59 254 241 78
1960–69 2,008 964 198
1970–79 4,517 1,405 262
1980–89 6,322 904 790
1990–99 7,850 1,539 1,939
2000–02 1,311 324 324
Total 23,747 6,632 4,221
Firms in the waiting-time sample
FIGURE 5
The ex post real interest rate on commercial paper,
1885–2002
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based on individual company histories and our exten-
sion of the stock files distributed by the University
of Chicago’s Center for Research in Securities Prices
(CRSP) from its 1925 starting date back through
1885 using newspaper sources.2 Figure 4 shows these
series after smoothing with the Hodrick-Prescott fil-
ter. Table 1 shows the coverage of our collection of
IPO waiting times by decade. Waiting times by either
measure were longest in the 1950s and 1960s and
shortest at both ends of the twentieth century.
To what extent do these waiting times reflect
waiting to implement projects? According to figure 4,
the smoothed number of years between
founding and listing ranges from ten to 60
years. It is hard to believe that a firm de-
lays entirely for the purpose of perfecting
and honing and then finally initiating its
project when it goes public. Moreover,
many profitable firms remain private. The
time it takes to go public probably de-
pends on several factors that are absent
from our model. What matters, however,
is time variation in the time to go public,
which, barring any technological changes,
is probably driven partly by incentives
that we have modeled. While it may at
first seem unlikely that the age  at IPO
should have increased by 15 years or 20
years in the 1940s entirely in response to
interest rates, figure 2 shows that the
model is able to generate very sharp in-
creases in waiting times as interest rates
near zero. Indeed, this is a robust implica-
tion. From equation 5 it follows that as the
interest rate tends toward zero, the waiting
time goes to infinity. No other parameter
restrictions are required for this conclusion
to hold. It is also true, however, that the
relation is much steeper at low rates than
it is at high rates. Thus, the greatest poten-
tial of this model to explain waiting times
is when interest rates fluctuate around a
low level.
Figure 5 shows the real interest rate
on commercial paper with 30–90 days un-
til maturity from 1885 to 2002, along with
an HP-filtered (Hodrick–Prescott) trend.3
Real rates were lowest in the middle of the
twentieth century, and the series is rough-
ly U-shaped. The long wait times in the
1950s and the corresponding negative real
interest rates appear roughly consistent with
our model. To examine the low-frequency
relationship between T and r more precisely, however,
we average both across ten-year periods and test for
non-monotonicity with a quadratic regression.
Figure 6 shows a scatterplot of averages by decade
of T on r, with T measured by the number of years
from founding to exchange listing. Figure 7 instead
uses years from incorporation as the measure of T. In
either case, a U-shaped pattern appears in the data. The
regressions in table 2 confirm this, with the coefficient
on the real interest rate negative and significant at the
5 percent level for the linear term and positive (though
FIGURE 6
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years founding to listing
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FIGURE 7
T (from incorporation) on r
years incorporation to listing
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not significant) for the quadratic term. We interpret
this as supporting evidence for the first implication
of our model. We note, however, that negative real
interest rates are inconsistent with the model and that
instead of varying between 0 percent and 10 percent
(as the interest rate does in the theoretical plots of
figures 1–3), the decade averages vary from about
–3 percent to 7 percent.
Testing the relation between investment and the real
interest rate
The second implication deals with the relation
between IPO investment and the real rate of interest.
In testing for this, we provide a parallel analysis of
the relation between aggregate investment (which is
dominated by investment of stock-market
incumbents) and the rate of interest. We
do this to contrast the two relationships.
IPO-issuing firms probably face
much greater uncertainty than incumbent
firms. IPO-issuing firms are in the process
of defining themselves, their products,
and their technologies, and once they
have chosen these directions, there is no
going back for most of them. Choosing
the wrong standard, for example, can con-
demn a new business to an early demise.
There is a real sense, then, in which their
investments are irreversible.
Incumbent firms, on the other hand,
have chosen their domains of operation
and face uncertainty more in the scale of
demand, input prices, and so on. For these
firms, there is less to be gained by waiting
because there is less uncertainty to be
resolved by delaying investment. There-
fore, we would expect the investment of
incumbents to be negatively related to the
rate of interest. So, while we do not offer
a model of incumbent investment, we note
that the standard Q-theory model of invest-
ment (for example, Hayashi, 1982) with
convex adjustment costs and no irrevers-
ibilities, predicts that a rise in the interest
rate reduces investment.
Our model implies that, unlike incum-
bent investment, the relation between IPO
investment and the rate of interest should
be an inverted-U. Figure 8 shows the two
investment series that we consider. The
yellow line is private domestic investment
as a percentage of the aggregate capital
stock.4 The black line is the value of IPO-
issuing firms at the end of each year as a percentage
of total stock market capitalization.5 While investment
rates tended to rise until the Great Depression and then
stabilized after World War II, IPOs followed a more
erratic pattern, with the value of new equity largest
around the turn of the twentieth century, around 1915,
in the late 1920s, at the end of World War II, in the
late 1960s, the mid-1980s, and the 1990s.
To examine the low-frequency relationship between
these measures of investment and r more precisely,
we again average across ten-year periods.
Figure 9 shows a scatterplot of decade averages of
r on IPO value, along with the fitted values from a qua-
dratic regression. Figure 10 shows the scatterplot and
quadratic regression line for incumbents’ investments.
TABLE 2
Regressions of waiting times (T) on the real
commercial paper rate (r) by decade, 1886–2002
Dependent variable
T from founding T from incorporation
rt –3.47 –5.58 –1.71 –2.96
(–2.23) (–2.46) (–1.77) (–2.07)
2
t r 0.63 0.37
(1.25) (1.17)
constant 41.68 39.46 21.11 19.81
(8.37) (7.65) (6.80) (6.10)
R2 .33 .43 .24 .34
N 12 12 12 12
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses.
FIGURE 8
Annual IPOs as a % of stock market value;
private investment as a % of the capital stock, 1886–2002
I/K (left scale)
IPOs (right scale)
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We report the details of the quadratic regressions and
their linear counterparts in table 3. For IPO invest-
ment, the linear term is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level, while the coefficient
on the quadratic term is negative and approaching
statistical significance. We interpret this as evidence
for the inverted U-shape that the model predicts.
With incumbent investment, we also find an inverted
U-shape, but the coefficient on the linear term is
much smaller and not statistically significant.
Summary of the empirical results
To the extent that we may proxy im-
plementation delays by the ages of firms
at their IPOs, our results, on the whole,
confirm the implications of the model.
This is especially true for the backward-
bending IPO-investment schedule. We did
not find such evidence for the investment
of established firms.
Our focus has been on the individual
firm’s decision and not the aggregate equi-
librium aspects surrounding IPOs. Had we
analyzed these, we would have needed to
mention economies of scale in IPO activi-
ty and start-up activity (for example, due
to concentration of venture capital focus)
and to discuss the models of Diamond
(1982) and Veldcamp (2003) that could
perhaps explain some IPO waves.
We have assumed that, at IPO, the
public pays exactly what the firm is worth.
FIGURE 9
IPOs as a share of stock market capitalization
IPOs/stock market (percent)
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In a more expansive paper, one could en-
tertain a hypothesis of “irrational exuber-
ance,” or times when the public is willing
to pay more than the firm is worth. Along
the lines of Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003)
paper on mergers, one could argue that
perhaps IPO-issuing firms wait in the
wings in order to take advantage of such
exuberance. If so, the beneficiaries are
neither the IPO-issuing firms nor the par-
ticipating venture capitalists themselves.
Data from Ritter (2003a, b) show that, de-
spite being times of high IPO volume,
high-Q periods are, in fact, times of more
severe underpricing of firms going public.
In other words, models in which a naive
shareholder buys overpriced firms will
not explain the time-series correlation be-
tween the volume of IPOs and Tobin’s Q.
Perhaps it is only the investment bankers
who benefit from such exuberance.
Conclusion
We have presented and tested a neoclassical model
with liquidity constraints. In this model, delay to im-
plementation occurs because the firm is trying to im-
prove its idea to the point where it becomes optimal to
incur the fixed cost of implementing a project.
The broader implication of our work here is that
lowering interest rates may impede new ideas rather
than foster them. But this does not mean that low
interest rates are bad for firms, even when they lead
firms to postpone their investment. Regardless of
FIGURE 10
Investment rate on r
I/K
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how investment reacts, the value of projects rises as
the interest rate falls.
Nor do our results say that low interest rates dis-
courage all investment broadly defined. Our finding
that at low rates physical-capital investment rises
TABLE 3
Regressions of IPOs and the investment rate
on the commercial paper rate (r) by decade, 1886–2002
Dependent variable
IPOs / Stock market I/K
rt 0.20 0.56 –0.16 0.21
(0.86) (1.71) (–0.66) (0.61)
2
t r –0.11 –0.11
(–1.48) (–1.45)
constant 3.13 3.51 6.37 6.76
(4.23) (4.71) (8.08) (8.49)
R2 .07 .25 .04 .22
N 12 12 12 12
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses.
with the interest rate is really about the
composition of capital. A delay is a switch
of one kind of investment profile for an-
other. When the reason for delaying is the
gathering of information, total investment
(including information investment) may
still be monotone-decreasing in the inter-
est rate. Firms postpone physical invest-
ment, but they gather information, and
this is human capital. Before implement-
ing its project, the value of that project is
monotone-decreasing in the interest rate,
and that value—that is, the value of the
physical and human capital combined—
is being maximized by the firm’s policy.
Thus, when physical investment rises
with the interest rate, this simply means
that the firm’s human capital investment
is falling, and perhaps its total capital
properly measured. Therefore, for example, the Japa-
nese economy may be in better shape than it seems
today because the very individuals that are not in-
vesting may be accumulating a different kind of capi-
tal that is not measured as such.
NOTES
1Other evidence shows that increasing funds for investment is in-
deed one of the motives behind an IPO. Jain and Kini (1994, table 2),
for example, find that by the fourth year after its IPO, the firm
will experience a rise in sales of 80 percent compared with its in-
dustry counterparts and 143 percent compared with its own sales
in the year just before the IPO (also see Choe, Masulis, and Nanda,
1993; Lowry, 2002; and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002).
We find that the 1955–2001 correlation between funds that firms
take in at IPO and their real investment is 0.33 and highly significant.
Our assumption that the firm’s investment occurs at the time
of IPO brings us closer to the literature on liquidity constraints.
When an entrepreneur has a high return activity that he cannot
fund in the capital market, he has a greater incentive to save, be-
cause those savings can fund an investment that is more profit-
able than the average market investment. Buera (2003) analyzes
optimal saving behavior by liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs.
2Listing years after 1925 are those for which firms enter CRSP. For
1885–1924, they are years in which prices first appear in the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listings of The Annalist, Bradstreet’s,
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, or The New York Times.
The 6,632 incorporation dates used to construct figure 4 are from
Moody’s Industrial Manual (1920, 1928, 1955, 1980), Standard
and Poor’s Stock Market Encyclopedia (1981, 1988, 2000), vari-
ous editions of Standard and Poor’s Stock Reports, and Mergent
Online. The 4,221 foundings are from Dun and Bradstreet’s Mil-
lion Dollar Directory (2000), Moody’s, Etna M. Kelley (1954),
and individual company websites. We linearly interpolate the se-
ries between missing points before applying the HP-filter to cre-
ate the time series in the figure.
3Commercial paper rates are annual averages of 30-day terms from
the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) database for 1934–
2002 and 60–90 day terms from Homer and Sylla (1991) for earlier
years. We compute the ex post return by subtracting inflation as
computed by the growth of the implicit price deflator for gross do-
mestic product (GDP) from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) (2003) for 1929–2002 and Berry (1988) for earlier years.
4To build the investment rate series, we start with gross private domes-
tic investment in current dollars from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2003, table 1, pp. 123–124) for 1929–2001 and then ratio-
splice the gross capital formation series in current dollars, exclud-
ing military expenditures, from Kuznets (1961b, tables T-8 and T-8a)
for 1870–1929. We construct the net capital stock using the private
fixed assets tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003) for
1925–2002. Then, using the estimates of the net stock of non-military
capital from Kuznets (1961a, table 3, pp. 64–65) in 1869, 1879, 1889,
1909, 1919, and 1929 as benchmarks, we use the percent changes
in a synthetic series for the capital stock formed by starting with
the 1869 Kuznets (1961a) estimate of $27 billion and adding net
capital formation in each year through 1929 from Kuznets (1961b)
to create an annual series that runs through the benchmark points.
Finally, we ratio-splice the resulting series for 1870–1925 to the later
BEA series. The investment rate that appears in figure 8 is the ra-
tio of our final investment to the capital stock series, expressed as
a percentage.
5The stock market data are from the CRSP files and our backward
extension of them to 1885. NYSE firms are available in CRSP
continuously, AMEX firms after 1961, and NASDAQ firms after
1971. New listings are given by the total year-end market value
of firms that entered our database in each year, excluding Ameri-
can depository receipts (ADRs).11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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